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IDEAS AND ACTION 
IN POSTWAR BRAZIL1
Joseph L. Love
That Brazil is an important country is unexceptionable, given its
size (larger than the United States without Alaska), population
(160 million), and gross national product (tenth largest in the
world). In each sphere—territory, population, economy—Brazil
accounts for nearly half of the South American total, and a third
of that of Latin America as a whole. The country is known for its
coffee, its tropical forests, its popular music, its beaches. Regret-
tably, in recent years it has also been known for its social and
environmental problems—its urban and rural poverty; its huge
population of street children and the crimes against them; the
struggle for land in a country with an immense frontier; and the
destruction of the Amazonian forest. Moreover, its impressive
spurts of economic growth have resulted in one of the world’s
highest concentrations of income, leading some observers to
term the country “Belgium in India.”
I do not intend to predict the outcome of these matters, but
rather to address the ideas that Brazilian intellectuals have pro-
posed to deal with their nation’s daunting problems, all of
which are at root social and economic.
Barely more than a generation ago, some American and Euro-
pean intellectuals would have dismissed the notion that Brazil-
ian (or Latin American) social thought could have been
significantly original, or that it could have an impact beyond
Brazilian or Latin American frontiers. After all, the colonial
metropolis, Portugal, had fallen into an intellectual torpor two
or three generations after the arrival of the Spanish Inquisition
in 1536. In contrast to Spain in Spanish America, Portugal had
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denied its Brazilian colony institutions of higher education and
even a printing press until 1808, when the Portuguese Royal
Family fled to Brazil in order to avert capture by Napoleon. No
university (as opposed to isolated professional schools) existed
in Brazil until the late 1920s. As late as 1969, the Brazilian
philosopher José Artur Giannotti remarked that he had had to
invent a wide range of philosophical neologisms in Portuguese
in order to publish his work on the early Marx, As Origens da
Dialéctica (The origins of dialectics) — a problem that did not
exist for his French translator.2
If Marx and Engels were right that consciousness is a social
product, then originality is a matter of degree, and ideas are
notoriously international. The Brazilian ideas I will discuss
(inspired, in many cases, by European ones) are Third World
readings of pressing social problems. We do not have to agree
with the critic Paulo Emílio Salles Gomes, who refers to Brazil-
ians’ “creative lack of competence in copying,”3 to appreciate
that emulation can lead to adaptation and, often, to transforma-
tion.
The ideas at issue are practical ideas, in that they link theory
and praxis. Although the Brazilians played a leading role in
developing them (and left a distinctively Brazilian mark on
them), they are also regional, Latin American. And they have
been highly influential not only in Latin America, but well
beyond it. I have grouped these ideas into four theoretical cate-
gories:4 (Economic) Structuralism; Dependency; Liberation The-
ology; and Pedagogy of the Oppressed, the last of which was
uniquely pioneered by the Brazilian philosopher of education
Paulo Freire. Properly adapted, these ideologies have broad
application in Third World contexts and others.
Each set of ideas arose in response to major social problems in
the third quarter of this century. I will consider the origins of
these ideologies, their relationship with one another, and specu-
late on their relevance today.
I. Structuralism
Chronologically, the first idea was Structuralism, which bears a
family resemblance to the more familiar and coeval French
Structuralism, whose most renowned exemplar in economics
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was François Perroux. The Structuralist school associated with
the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (ECLA or, in
Spanish, CEPAL) was founded by the Argentinean Raúl Pre-
bisch, who in 1949 characterized the international economy as a
set of relations between an industrialized Center and a Periph-
ery exporting foodstuffs and raw materials. According to Pre-
bisch and his associates, the main problems of the Periphery
were structural unemployment, caused by the inability of tradi-
tional export industries to grow and, therefore, to absorb excess
rural population; external disequilibrium, the result of a greater
propensity to import industrial goods than to export traditional
agricultural and mineral goods; and deteriorating terms of trade
— all of which a properly implemented policy of industrializa-
tion could help eliminate.5 These ideas were first sketched out in
The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Prob-
lems, ECLA’s “manifesto” (Spanish ed., 1949).
Judging by the diffusion of his works alone, the leading
Brazilian Structuralist Celso Furtado is his country’s most influ-
ential social scientist of the century. In Latin America, where
books are usually printed in editions of one to two thousand
copies, Furtado’s works had sold some two hundred thousand
copies in Spanish and Portuguese by 1972. World sales of his
works had reached a million copies by 1990, and half these
books were published in Latin America.
Furtado hailed from a remote area of northeastern Brazil — a
“periphery of the periphery” — called the sertão, a semiarid
region marked by periodic drought and social unrest. He lived
in the small state of Paraíba, where his father was a judge, until
he was twenty. Furtado began his studies at the University of
Brazil in 1940, but the war interrupted his education, and he
served in the Italian campaign. In 1948 Furtado presented a dis-
sertation at the Faculté de Droit in Paris on the Brazilian econ-
omy during the colonial era6 and was one of the first Brazilians
to hold a doctorate in economics. The same year, the young man
joined ECLA in Santiago and moved back and forth between
Santiago and Brazil, where he participated in economic plan-
ning at the highest levels, holding ministerial posts. The first
director of the Northeast Development Agency (SUDENE), he
lost his political rights after the coup d’état of 1964. Furtado
went into exile, first arriving at ECLA headquarters in Santiago,
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Chile, but soon leaving for Yale; he found a permanent post at
the University of Paris until 1975, when an amnesty permitted
his return to Brazil while he maintained a teaching post in Paris.
The influence of both John Maynard Keynes and Prebisch was
obvious in Furtado’s first essay in economics, “General Charac-
teristics of the Brazilian Economy,” written in 1949 and pub-
lished the following year.7 In this essay Furtado built on
Prebisch’s analysis of the business cycle in 1949 regarding the
high import coefficients typical of Latin American countries: he
argued that income tended to concentrate in Brazil during the
upswing of the cycle, owing in part to a highly elastic labor sup-
ply that held down wages. Further, he hypothesized that much
of the effect of the Keynesian multiplier8 “leaked” abroad, owing
to the exporting groups’ high propensity to import. Such analy-
sis pointed again to the importance of an industrialization pol-
icy.
Furtado’s Economic Growth of Brazil9 ultimately derived from
his pre-ECLA interests in defining the features of colonial Brazil.
This work covered the whole sweep of Brazilian history, and the
colonial and nineteenth-century sections compare and contrast
the structures of the Brazilian and U.S. economies, showing how
Brazil’s monoculture and latifundia impeded the high savings
and investment rates characteristic of the American economy.
Focusing on the distribution of income and the size of the
domestic market, Furtado provided one of the first uses of mod-
ern income analysis in a historical framework, and demon-
strated the weak relationship between income and investment
in an economy based on slavery. The work throughout is writ-
ten from the point of view of a development economist, empha-
sizing the heterogeneity of technologies and production
functions (including the vast subsistence sector) in the Brazilian
economy.
Elaborating on his article of 1950, Furtado pointed to Brazil’s
rapid industrial growth during the Great Depression, caused in
part by the “socialization of losses” of coffee producers through
exchange devaluation: this process helped maintain domestic
demand by keeping up the employment level and purchasing
power in the coffee sector, which in turn permitted the rise of a
significant domestic demand for industrial goods when foreign
products were unavailable, owing to the absence of foreign
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exchange. The stockpiling and destruction of coffee in the face of
grossly excess supply were financed through credit expansion,
in turn exacerbating the external disequilibrium and causing
new exchange depreciation and a further socialization of
losses.10
Furtado viewed the expansionary fiscal and monetary poli-
cies related to coffee as a form of unwitting Keynesianism,
because the wealth destroyed in coffee beans was considerably
less than that created by maintaining employment.11 He then
noted that output of capital goods in Brazil by 1932 was 60 per-
cent greater than in 1929. Furthermore, net investment in 1935,
at constant prices, was greater than that in 1929, and the level of
aggregate income of the latter year had been regained, despite
the fact that the import of capital goods was only half of the 1929
figure.12 Therefore, the economy was undergoing profound
structural change.
Furtado, we may infer, was manifestly influenced by his Key-
nesian background, especially with regard to government inter-
vention to sustain demand, and the significance of the domestic
market in dynamizing production and income.13 For him, as for
other Structuralist contemporaries, the Great Depression was a
watershed in which the larger Latin American economies
moved definitively to one in which the domestic rather than the
international market was the motor of growth, and for which
industrialization led the growth process. Furtado’s views on
Brazilian industrialization during the Depression touched off a
long debate.14
Although the centrality of industrialization as the dynamic
element in growth during the Great Depression has largely been
confirmed for Brazil, Argentina, Chile, and Mexico, it now
appears that the disruption in international trade during the
World Wars and the Depression was less important in produc-
ing “inward-directed growth,” in Prebisch’s phrase, than was
believed by some contemporaries to these events and by ECLA
economists later.15 In any event, econometric research in the
1990s suggests an important correlation between economic
growth and participation in international trade.16 A now widely
held view is that investment in industry (capacity) grew in 
line with export earnings for the period 1900–1945, while output
(but not capacity) tended to rise during the shocks of war and
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depression, when imports had to be curtailed. Capacity during
the Depression could not grow appreciably in Brazil—nor in the
several other industrializing Latin American nations — for lack
of exchange credits to buy capital goods. Neither did it grow
rapidly during the World Wars because of the unavailability of
capital goods and fuels from the belligerent powers.17
In addition to historicizing Structuralism, Furtado explored
the school’s potential in another direction, as did Hans W.
Singer, who, in 1950, had developed a model of the international
trading process similar to Prebisch’s.18 I refer to the problem
now known as “internal colonialism.”19 Furtado and Singer
independently built their analyses in the 1950s around per-
ceived unequal exchange between industrial centers and agri-
cultural peripheries. I will focus on the Furtado version, which
was published first and in a fuller form, though Singer’s work
was completed earlier.20 It was in the context of analyzing inter-
nal colonialism that Furtado first began to link development and
underdevelopment as components of a single historical process.
The model of the international trading process on which
Singer and Furtado drew was that of ECLA (developed by Pre-
bisch in 1949) and Singer’s very similar one, independently
arrived at and published a year later.21 According to Prebisch
and Singer, at the international level unequal exchange derived
from differential productivities between industrial Center and
agricultural Periphery in the world market, combined with dif-
ferent institutional arrangements in capital and labor markets.
Technological progress in manufacturing, in any case, was
shown in a rise in incomes in developed countries, while that in
the production of food and raw materials in underdeveloped
countries was expressed in a fall in prices relative to industrial
goods.
Furtado addressed the issue of internal colonialism in the late
1950s as he became more deeply involved in the problems of his
native Northeast. This agrarian and latifundium-dominated
region in 1956 had an annual per capita income of less than
U.S.$100, whereas the Center-South enjoyed a level of income
more than three times higher because of the dynamic industrial
economy organized around the cities of São Paulo and Rio de
Janeiro. The gap between the Northeast and the Center-South
was larger than that between the per capita income of the latter
Macalester International Vol. 5
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region and those of Western Europe.22 Furtado estimated that
the ratio between the growth rates of the lagging and leading
regions was on the order of 1:2 for the decade after 1948.23 More-
over, the distribution of income within the Northeast was highly
skewed, making the situation even more desperate for the
masses.
Like Prebisch, Furtado assumed the existence of market
imperfections — particularly the administered pricing of indus-
trial goods — and a virtually unlimited supply of labor in the
backward region at the going wage in the industrial sector. But
the Brazilian’s model was more complex than Prebisch’s inter-
national one, because it purported to measure the deterioration
of terms of trade between the international price of agricultural
goods sold abroad by Northeast Brazil against the domestic
price of industrial goods that the region had to buy from the
Center-South.
Furtado analyzed the Northeast in terms of a triangular trade
between the backward region, the foreign sector and the devel-
oped area of Brazil.24 Brazil’s Northeast had a surplus in its com-
mercial balance abroad but a deficit in its balance of payments
with its domestic trading partner, the Center-South. The state
was also an essential element in the trading process: in imple-
menting its policy of import-substitution industrialization, the
central government was subsidizing industrialists and penaliz-
ing agricultural exporters. This support took the form of differ-
ential exchange rates for importers of manufacturing-related
capital goods and importers who would use foreign exchange
credits for other purposes.25
That the central government gave exporters poorer exchange
rates than importers not only effected a sectoral transfer of
income but also induced a regional transfer. This was particu-
larly so because of the size of the export sector relative to real
(national) income in the Northeast compared to that of the Cen-
ter-South. Furthermore, the government stimulated industrial
development by financing private enterprise, a process that
principally aided the Center-South. Finally, economies of scale
and external economies in the industrial heartland of the Rio-
São Paulo area made the hitherto large industrial advantages of
the region, relative to the Northeast, even greater as develop-
ment proceeded. Consequently, central government policies
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designed to stimulate industrialization had a major inequalizing
effect on the regional distribution of income in the country. 
Furtado estimated that in the period 1948–1956, the Northeast
transferred U.S.$24 million annually to the Center-South,
although a more accurate figure may be $15–17 million yearly.26
Because of Brazil’s protectionist tariffs and related exchange
policies, the Northeast was in no position to seek alternative
supplies abroad for its manufacturing needs. It offered a captive
market for the Center-South, and its foreign exchange earnings
gave it purchasing power in that region. But the relevant terms
of trade now entered the picture: overall, prices of the Center-
South’s industrial goods rose more rapidly from 1948 to 1956
(the years studied by Furtado) than the exchange rate fell, that
is, the rate at which northeastern exporters gained more
cruzeiros per unit of foreign currency.27
Furtado proposed industrialization as a solution to the North-
east’s economic problems.28 He also stressed the need for agri-
cultural development, implying the need for agrarian reform,
because the cost of wage-goods (i.e., foodstuffs) in the largest
city of the Northeast, Recife, was rising faster than that of São
Paulo. Consequently, if wage differentials were narrowing
between São Paulo and Recife to meet rising costs of living in
the latter, there would be little incentive for private capital to
invest in the Northeast.29 Agrarian reform has only begun in the
1990s, however, and in the years following Furtado’s analysis,
development strategies favoring the Center-South have tended
to prevail. Despite efforts of the federal government to offset
regional income concentration, economist Werner Baer has con-
cluded that the overall effect of development programs contin-
ued to favor the industrial Center-South over the agrarian
Northeast in the three and a half decades following Furtado’s
analysis.30
II. Dependency
In one of his regional studies examining the interaction of the
industrial Center-South and the agrarian Northeast, Furtado
had already perceived in 1959 that a structural and perverse
relationship existed between the growth of developed capitalist
economies (and regions) and the growth of underdeveloped
Macalester International Vol. 5
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countries (and regions): “[There is] . . . a tendency for industrial
economies, as a result of their form of growth, to inhibit the
growth of primary economies: This same phenomenon is occur-
ring within our country.”31 It is notable for the history of Depen-
dency analysis that Furtado’s first published statement of the
alleged causal relationship between development and underde-
velopment appeared in the context of internal colonialism,
rather than at the international level.
Furtado’s book Development and Underdevelopment32 advanced
his early efforts as an analyst of Dependency. His reference to
the relation of development and underdevelopment in A oper-
ação nordeste (Operation Northeast)33 had been explicit, but in
Development and Underdevelopment, a work combining analytical
and historical approaches, he described how the European
industrial economy by the nineteenth century had penetrated
and transformed precapitalistic economies. Underdeveloped
economies were “hybrid structures”34 and not simply undevel-
oped economies beginning to trace the path that Europe had
already defined. Consequently, underdevelopment was a “dis-
crete historical process through which economies that have
already achieved a high level of development have not necessar-
ily passed.”35 Economic development was “emphatically an
unequal process,” Furtado argued,36 and recent historical studies
by Paul Bairoch and others have confirmed this observation at
the international level.37
In Development and Underdevelopment, Furtado distinguished
between autonomous development, which was supply-driven,
and an externally induced development, which was demand-
driven. In the latter process, the manner of industrialization —
substituting domestic products for imports — led the entrepre-
neur “to adopt a technology compatible with a cost and price
structure similar to that . . . in the international manufactured
goods market.”38 Therefore, labor-saving techniques were con-
tinually adopted, despite the need for industrial employment.
Even earlier, Furtado had stressed the importance of conspicu-
ous consumption as a driving force in underdeveloped coun-
tries’ internal dynamics.39
In the mid- and latter 1960s Structuralist theories and policy
prescriptions were not only challenged by a neoclassical Right,
but also by a heterodox Left, some of whose exegetes had been
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leading figures in ECLA itself, notably Furtado and the Chilean
Osvaldo Sunkel. This new Left would quickly make “Depen-
dency Theory” famous.40 Although ECLA itself had produced
nothing if not a kind of Dependency analysis, the new variety
was set off by its more clear-cut “historicizing” and “sociologiz-
ing” tendencies in both its reformist and radical versions.41 In the
mid-sixties, Furtado elaborated the contention that development
and underdevelopment were historically linked.
In an essay published in 1964, Furtado called for a return to
dialectics, and “The Dialectics of Development” was in fact the
Portuguese title of Diagnosis of the Brazilian Crisis. He meant by
this a kind of methodological holism, without which the indi-
vidual parts of a social entity in continual motion could not be
understood. This approach required a return to history because
the tendency to focus on equilibrium concepts in neoclassical
economics denied process. Even if the developed economies
could roughly be described as being in dynamic equilibrium,
this state did not apply to the underdeveloped Periphery, where
the continual introduction of labor-saving techniques resulted in
a surplus labor supply beyond that already present in the large
subsistence sector.42 In this interpretation, Furtado included a
class analysis already foreshadowed in Development and Under-
development.43 He argued that class struggle had historically been
the engine of economic growth in the advanced West: workers
“attack” through organization to raise their share of the national
product, and capitalists “counterattack” by introducing labor-
saving technology; in this manner, a dynamic equilibrium is
approximated. Since labor is unorganized in the Periphery,
above all in the rural sector, he asserted, the process fails to
work there.44
In works published between 1970 and 1978, Furtado elabo-
rated on the contention that underdevelopment was a historical
process intimately related to the development of the industrial
West. Upper strata in backward regions adopted the consump-
tion patterns of the developed West as such areas entered the
international division of labor.45 This process was the “result of
the surplus generated through static comparative advantages in
foreign trade. It is the highly dynamic nature of the modernized
component of consumption that brings dependence into the
technological realm and makes it part of the production struc-
Macalester International Vol. 5
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ture.”46 Novel items of consumption require increasingly sophis-
ticated techniques and increasing amounts of capital. But capital
accumulation is associated with income concentration, so indus-
trialization “advances simultaneously with the concentration of
income.”47 Thus, in underdeveloped countries, the consumption
patterns of the groups that appropriate the economic surplus
and their concomitant political power—and not the elastic labor
supply, as Furtado had once believed — determine the differen-
tial between the industrial wage rate and that of the subsistence
sector, and keep it stable.48
In 1978 Furtado wrote a large statement on Dependency,
Accumulation and Development, in which he attempted to relate
accumulation to social stratification and political power.49 For
Furtado, the struggle against dependence usually begins with a
demand for national control of nonrenewable resources, fol-
lowed by a similar effort to control the home market. Victories
in these areas will create the possibility of freedom from finan-
cial dependence, in permitting the accumulation of a critical
mass of financial resources necessary for economic develop-
ment. But only after these three conquests could the most diffi-
cult problem be attacked, the control of technological progress,
currently the most important form of domination by the coun-
tries of the Center; technological innovation formed a crucial
link between the Center and the Periphery, based on capital-
intensive production for the consumption of upper strata.50
Another Brazilian, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, played a
major role in moving the Dependency perspective toward an
analysis of social relations in the latter sixties. Although born
into a family of military officers in Rio de Janeiro, Cardoso
received his secondary and higher education in São Paulo. At
the University of São Paulo he quickly became a prominent soci-
ologist. After completing his dissertation on Brazilian slavery,
Cardoso turned to the problem of industrialization, a subject of
obvious interest in São Paulo. He did postgraduate work with
the labor sociologist Alain Touraine at the University of Paris,
where, like Furtado, Cardoso would later teach. His special
interest was Brazilian entrepreneurs, about whom he published
a book in 1964. Like Furtado, Cardoso went into exile after the
coup, locating in Santiago, Chile, where both men associated
with ECLA.
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Rejecting the view that the several national bourgeoisies
would bring full capitalist development to Latin America, Car-
doso arrived at a pessimistic evaluation of this social group in
his empirical studies of industrialists in Brazil and Argentina.
His view that Latin America lacked what Charles Morazé has
termed a “conquering bourgeoisie” was shared by other South
American social scientists who studied the matter in the mid-
sixties.51 Cardoso had reached his position before the Brazilian
coup of 1964 — in which Brazilian business leaders supported
the generals—and before multinational corporations became so
prominent, and native industrialists less conspicuous, in the
more open economies of the Argentinean and Brazilian dictator-
ships of the latter 1960s.
Dependency and Development was a collaborative work by Car-
doso, who provided most of the theoretical perspective, and
Enzo Faletto, a Chilean sociologist who was largely responsible
for the comparative historical studies in the joint effort.52
Although Osvaldo Sunkel, a Chilean Structuralist-turned-
Dependency-analyst, spoke of the international capitalist system
as “a determining influence on local processes” and one which
was “internal” to the Periphery’s own structure, Cardoso and
Faletto preferred to speak of two subsystems — the internal and
the external — and emphasized that the international capitalist
system was not solely determining. There was a complex inter-
nal dynamic to the system, they asserted.53 Beyond this, Cardoso
stressed the mutual interests among social classes across the
Center-Periphery system. The interests of the bourgeoisie of the
Center, and by implication, those of its proletariat, overlapped
those of sectors of the bourgeoisie of the Periphery; these links
became all the more intimate as multinational firms loomed ever
larger in Latin America.54 Cardoso and Faletto analyzed the
development of the “populist” coalition of national capital with
the working class, corresponding to the successful phase of
industrialization, and linked the failure of the import-substitu-
tion model with the demise of the populist political style. In the
current phase of capital accumulation, they believed, authoritar-
ian regimes were needed to assure a political demobilization of
the masses.55
Their treatment of Dependency, despite its early appearance,
was more nuanced than others, emphasizing contradiction,
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shifting alliances, and a range of historical possibility. Cardoso
and Faletto distinguished between simple enclave economies
and those controlled by local bourgeoisies. For the latter, they
entertained the possibility of significant manufacturing sectors.
In a scheme they called “associated development” or “develop-
ment with marginalization [marginalidad]” and which Cardoso
would later term “associated-dependent” development, they
noted that contemporary foreign capital was focusing its invest-
ment in manufacturing operations. Furthermore, the public sec-
tor, multinational capital, and the “national” capitalist sector
were joining hands under authoritarian rule. Like Furtado, Car-
doso and Faletto pointed to the international system as a whole
as the proper unit of analysis; and like Furtado, they saw devel-
opment and underdevelopment not as stages but as locations
within the international economic system, for which they
offered a schematic historical analysis of the Periphery’s class
dynamics.56 This feature of Cardoso’s Dependency analysis —
emphasizing the possibilities of growth against the theses of
Furtado, Rui Mauro Marini, and the American Andre Gunder
Frank — became more prominent in the midst of the “Brazilian
economic miracle” of 1968 – 73. Cardoso was soon to emphasize
the importance of the “internationalization of the domestic mar-
ket,” dominated by multinationals, as the source of dynamism
in the present stage of the history of imperialism.57
What are the sources of Cardoso’s analysis? Marxist roots
have frequently been ascribed to Dependency.58 One who makes
the attribution is Cardoso himself, for many students the most
important Dependency writer. This interpretation has been rein-
forced by the English edition of Dependency and Development
(1979) by Cardoso and Faletto, in which preface, postscript, and
parts of the text show a strong Marxist orientation. By contrast,
the first Spanish edition (1969) is far less obviously influenced
by Marxism, and the original draft (1965) is recognizably a
Structuralist product. In this first version the authors challenge
the Parsonian categories of modernization theory, and they are
pessimistic about the reformism of local bourgeoisies, but from
an eclectic perspective. No Marxist studies were cited in the
draft, and Marxist categories are almost completely lacking. The
theme receiving most attention in the 1965 version was the inad-
equacy of the bourgeois-directed project of development, partly
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resulting from increasing market domination by multinational
corporations.59
The issue of lineage — Structuralist or Marxist — is clouded,
however, by elements in Cardoso’s 1964 study on Brazilian
entrepreneurs. That work adumbrates one of his most important
contributions to the Dependency tradition — namely, his denial
of the adequacy of Parsonian-derived “modernization theory,”
although in the limited context of the role of entrepreneurs.60 In
that work, Cardoso, though eclectic in methodology, cast his
major conclusions within a Marxist framework.61 Thus the
sources of Cardoso’s contribution were various, and a safe con-
clusion would seem to be that he could make his statement in
either a structuralist or a Marxist idiom. Yet it was initially made
in the former, as Dependency emerged in Santiago.
Structuralism could accommodate all the major tenets of
Dependency,62 save one: the failure of the national bourgeoisie, a
proposition that the Brazilian Communist Party also found hard
to accept. Yet perhaps because of the centrality of the thesis of a
failed bourgeoisie for Dependency analysis, many writers
adopted an exclusively Marxist perspective as the decade of the
sixties developed. Dependency analysis matured as a “region”
of Marxism: it offered a perspective on imperialism that the clas-
sical Marxist theorists of the subject had ignored, namely, the
view from the Periphery. A respectable Marxist pedigree was
apparently required to validate the Dependency perspective
after its radicalization, and after it was challenged by those
claiming to represent an orthodox Marxist tradition.63 Yet most
of the Dependency propositions were initially derived from
Structuralism, rather than Marxism, even when compatible with
the latter school. In any event, Dependency became influential
outside Latin America in the 1970s. The best-known historical
model of world capitalism developing the implications of
Dependency was Immanuel Wallerstein’s The Modern World-
System.64
From the vantage point of the 1990s, one can see that Car-
doso’s version of Dependency has weathered better than others,
notably those of Marini and Frank: in Heinrich Rickert’s classic
distinction between “nomothetic,” law-giving sciences and
those which are “ideographic” or descriptive, Cardoso’s version
of Dependency was much closer to the latter, and he rejected
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Marini’s effort to derive social laws from the Brazilian case.65
The viability of Brazilian capitalism, denied by Marini and
Frank, may still be a matter of debate, but the real level of wages
has risen since the 1970s despite the near-stagnation of per
capita income growth in the 1980s. The dictatorship, if not a mil-
itary role in governance, ended in 1985 and so was not “neces-
sary” for the operation of the economy, as it obviously was not
in Colombia and Venezuela, whose constitutional and bour-
geois-led regimes coexisted with the dictatorships of Brazil and
the Southern Cone.
While “orthodox” Marxists attacked Dependency for focusing
on relations in the international market and neglecting class
analysis — a charge only partly justified in the case of Cardoso
and unjustified in Marini’s work of the early 1970s—the Depen-
dency group was attacked by non-Marxist social scientists, espe-
cially in North America, for its vagueness, inconsistencies, and
inability to specify the conditions under which Dependency’s
propositions, if untrue, could be falsified (Karl Popper’s
“methodological monism” for bodies of knowledge seeking the
status of science).66 Cardoso’s frequently repeated affirmation
that Dependency did not offer a formal theory but a perspective
for contextual and historical analysis67 was seen as elusive.
Dependency’s inability to provide unambiguous solutions, or at
least programs in the Cardoso version, also weakened its
appeal. A key Dependency claim — the failure of Latin Amer-
ica’s national bourgeoisies “to fulfill their historic mission” in
building a new state and recasting hegemonic value structures
in the almost-mythical manner of the French revolutionaries —
should also be put into historical perspective. Were the Depen-
dency analysts aware of the critiques in England by Friedrich
Engels, or in Germany by Robert Michels, of the national bour-
geosie’s failure to construct its own hegemonic values?68 Aware
or not, they tended to view such matters as unproblematic, and
the achievement of bourgeois revolutions in Europe were taken
as given facts.
III. Pedagogy of the Oppressed
If Celso Furtado played the key role in the transition from Struc-
turalism to Dependency, Paulo Freire, another Northeasterner,
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sought a different kind of development. Whereas Furtado
looked to decisive state action, Freire wanted to start with the
masses, the povo. Despite his middle-class background, Freire
knew hunger during the early years of the Great Depression. A
profoundly religious man, he was the prophet of social justice.
For Freire, “What Ought to Be, Can Be.” He would presumably
have shunned the title Philosopher of Education — though he
was that — because of the emphasis he always placed on the
necessity of combining theory and practice. A powerful writer
even in translation, Freire ably communicated his excitement
about the relationship between literacy and liberation.
At the risk of oversimplification, let me try to summarize his
theses: The oppressed are the poor and powerless — the
wretched of the earth — exemplified by the peasants, workers,
and marginals of Northeast Brazil. They are dehumanized,
where dehumanization means “a distortion of the vocation of
becoming more fully human.”69 The oppressors, by their vio-
lence against the oppressed, have also denied themselves their
full humanity. For Freire, violence cannot be initiated by the
oppressed, by the very definition of their condition.70 But the
downtrodden should shun violence. They have a double obliga-
tion to liberate both themselves and their oppressors, yet they
fear freedom: the oppressed have internalized the self-image
supplied by the oppressor, and therefore must first discover,
and then analyze, their oppression.
Pedagogy for Freire must be with, and not for, the oppressed.
The role of the educator is to engage in a dialog with the
oppressed that will allow them to reflect on the world, in order
to transform it. The process is conscientização, of which “con-
sciousness-raising” is perhaps the best translation. Unfortu-
nately, the English phrase does not capture the whole meaning,
since in Portuguese (as in Spanish) consciência means “con-
science” as well as “consciousness.” Freire defines conscientiza-
ção as “the process by which human beings participate critically
in a transforming act”71 to secure their own liberation. Thus, con-
scientização is linked to praxis, which for Freire means more than
“practice”: Praxis is a chain of practice and reflection, in which
action is subjected to critical review and reconsideration to
guide (and correct) future action in pursuit of liberation.
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The problem is multidimensional. Underdevelopment and
the misery it entails imply a dependency relationship for subor-
dinate social classes, as well as dependency at an international
level for Brazilian culture on that of the developed West.72 “Cul-
tural invasion” must be opposed. “All domination involves
invasion,”73 Freire writes, at local and international levels, begin-
ning with the peasant’s internalization of the inevitability of his
social condition.
Contemporary illiteracy is the result of “the culture of
silence” with its rigid hierarchies. The oppressed in their dehu-
manization are reduced to “beings for another.”74 And yet, with
gentle guidance, the poor can secure their own liberation. In this
process, the teacher-student relationship is not one of subject
and object. The poor, the students, are not empty vessels into
which the educator pours knowledge. Rather, authentic think-
ing for Freire is dialogical.
Literacy and conscientização must come together in a phased
process. First comes codification—the abstraction from concrete
reality—and then decodification—the description and interpre-
tation.75 This exercise is focused on what Freire calls “generative
words” that have real meanings for the oppressed — casa
(house), fome (hunger), terra (land). Identifying with the emotive
ideas of such words, illiterates associate other words with them
— again based on the everyday lives of the oppressed — and
incorporate their stock into a reading vocabulary. Building on
their own experience in Portuguese, a highly phonetic language,
the poor can create their own texts.76 They problematize their
own existential situations and simultaneously learn to read with
an excitement and urgency that in turn educates the teacher.
Conscientização and becoming literate are thus fused in a sin-
gle enterprise. Freire does not hesitate to term the “Pedagogy of
the Oppressed” a revolutionary process, but one which is neces-
sarily dialogical. The achievement of literacy is only the begin-
ning of a broad social mobilization — through church groups,
neighborhood associations, sports clubs, trade unions, peasant
leagues, etc. — that will empower the masses. Freire had a
unique opportunity to combine theory and praxis in his home
town of Recife, Pernambuco, where the progressive Miguel
Arraes was elected mayor in 1960, and permitted Freire and oth-
ers to create the Movement of Popular Culture.
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The implications for existing patterns of domination are obvi-
ous, and as Freire and his crews of volunteer teachers succeeded
in Recife and then their movement spread to neighboring Rio
Grande do Norte, the classes conservadoras became alarmed. And
possibly for good reason, because in Pernambuco the literacy
campaign had enfranchised 200,000 new voters (rising to a mil-
lion from 800,000); in Rio Grande do Norte, 80,000 voters were
added to the previous total of 90,000.77 The military coup of
March-April 1964 put an immediate end to Freire’s experiment
and others based on it across the country. The educator was
jailed and then permitted to go into exile. In the open society of
Chile — seven years before the coup d’état of General Augusto
Pinochet—Freire continued his work and wrote his first system-
atic treatise, Education and the Practice of Freedom. Subsequently,
trying to avoid the image of guru or prophet, Freire became a
world-bestriding figure, employed by UNESCO in Guinea-Bis-
sau and Geneva, teaching at Harvard, advising the revolution-
ary government of Nicaragua, and returning to Brazil after the
amnesty of 1979.
With the triumph of the Workers’ Party in the municipal elec-
tions of São Paulo (a city of 22 million) in 1988, Freire was
appointed Secretary of Education by Mayor Luísa Erundina of
the Marxist Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers’ Party) and
introduced his program there in 1989–91. Directing a school sys-
tem of 662 schools with 40,000 employees, Freire had 710,000
pupils under his supervision. Retention rates at the elementary-
school level rose from 79 to 88 percent in this period, and teach-
ers’ salaries rose. But more characteristic of Freire’s style was the
introduction of a partly official, partly volunteer, literacy-with-
mobilization movement called MOVA. The movement fell short
of its goal of certifying 60,000 new adult literates, yet several
tens of thousands did learn to read and write.78 Freire resigned
in May 1991 to return to full-time writing and advocacy.
Until his death in 1997, Paulo Freire continued to defend his
ideas in print and in person, decrying the fact that 33 million
Brazilians were literally hungry in the mid-1990s. He rejected
postmodernism insofar as it proclaims the end of ideologies and
class struggle; for him, “reactionary postmodernism” masks an
immobilism that fails to oppose the designs of the regnant
neoliberal ideology,79 in which labor markets must be “flexible”
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and archaic and oppressive social structures are simply “institu-
tional rigidities.” Having in mind today’s neoliberals, Freire
recently wrote, “Conscientização, dreams, utopias, none are valid
to the immobilist.”80 In the Brave New World in which capital-
ism is seen as harsh, but just, education for the masses is at best
reduced to training, in which the question “Why?” is not per-
mitted.81
IV. Liberation Theology
Freire’s methods and convictions found a resonance in progres-
sive circles of the Roman Catholic Church even before the cre-
ation of Liberation Theology. This theology is not for everyone;
its purpose is to build “a Church with a preferential option for
the solidarity with the poor.”82 It has been a major movement in
Latin America since its inception in the decade after 1965, but
what makes it important is not only theory and ideology. In
Michael Lowy’s words, it is part of “Liberationist Christianity,”
which includes broad social movements.83
A radical theology arose partly in response to the fact that
Latin America, with 35 percent of the world’s Catholics (com-
pared to 33 percent in Europe), was served by far fewer reli-
gious than Europe c. 1960. Brazil was and is by far the world’s
largest Catholic community. The perception in Rome in the
1950s that Brazil and Latin America were not only poorly served
but poorly catechized led to a missionizing effort, along with a
program to train the brightest young Latin American priests in
Louvain, where many became acquainted with Left-oriented
social scientists.84
The Church itself took a new turn under the peasant Pope,
John XXIII, whose lead Paul VI followed in the Second Vatican
Council (1962–65). A radical position was evident by 1968 at the
Second Latin American Bishops’ Conference (CELAM) in
Medellín, Colombia. Sin was declared to be a collective matter,
as well as a personal one. Among other things, the conference
recognized the legitimacy of revolutionary insurrection. At the
economic level, CELAM supported the contention of Structural-
ism and Dependency that Latin America was the victim of
unequal exchange in the international trading process. Even ear-
lier, Catholic radicals in Brazil and elsewhere had begun form-
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ing alliances with others on the Left. But the following CELAM
in 1979 at Puebla, Mexico, drew back from radicalism under
John Paul II (l978 – ) and in general the present pope has been
hostile to Liberation Theology.
The term “Liberation Theology” seems first to have been used
in a doctoral thesis by the Brazilian Protestant theologian
Rubem Alves in 1968. But Alves did not refer to Latin America
specifically, and the tenets of Liberation Theology applied to the
region were first sketched out by the Peruvian Jesuit Gustavo
Gutiérrez the following year. Both works bore the title Toward a
Theology of Liberation.
What is this doctrine? First of all, it is theology, its proponents
insist, and not just an ideology critical of contemporary Third
World societies. Father Gutiérrez defines theology as “critical
reflection on praxis in the light of the word of God.”85 For Phillip
Berryman, one of Liberation Theology’s leading students, it con-
sists of the following three elements: (1) an interpretation of
faith out of the experience of the poor (a category much broader
than Marx’s proletariat); (2) a critique of society and its underly-
ing ideologies; and (3) a critique of the activity of the Church
from the viewpoint of the poor.86
More specifically, the doctrine includes the following tenets:
1. The “preferential option for the poor” implies an emphasis
on human rights (adequate food, shelter, health) rather than
civil rights, and collective rights over individual rights. But the
poor must participate in the process as actors through conscienti-
zação: The goal is “to make them conscious agents of their own
history.”87 In the words of the Brazilian theologians Leonardo
and Clodovis Boff, the people must be the primary agents of
their own liberation.88 This process is chiefly undertaken in
Christian Base Communities, often with a minimum of clerical
guidance, in which the poor read and meditate on Scripture, and
on how it may be used to transform their life circumstances.
2. Poverty is an evil, and results from oppression. Like Freire,
the Liberationists believe poverty dehumanizes the oppressed
as well as the oppressors, and for them, “Oppression is contrary
to the will of God.”89
3. Idolatry, not atheism, is the main enemy of religion. The
idols in question are Mammon, the Market, and National Secu-
rity programs to protect the existing social order.90
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4. Liberation Theology indicts dependent capitalism — in the
sense Fernando Henrique Cardoso describes — as a form of
structural sin.
5. Such a theology uses Marxism as its primary social science
method. To measure oppression and to determine what is social
sin, theology requires the instruments of social science.91
According to the Boff brothers, Liberation Theology opts for
dialectical reasoning about society and history, based on analy-
sis of contradictions, rather than functionalist social theory. For
them, the dialectic is not exclusively a Marxist form of reason-
ing; it exists in patristic theology and Biblical revelation (in addi-
tion to its appearance in Greek and Hegelian philosophy).
Marxism in short is “peripheral” to Liberation Theology; it is
used “partially and instrumentally.”92
6. Liberation Theology rejects Platonic dualism that would
separate history and redemption. In Liberation Theology, faith
“includes and transcends the demand for social liberation.”93
7. Liberation Theology has a biblical orientation; however,
“biblical” does not mean “literalist.” Both the Gospels and the
Old Testament are important, especially Exodus. Like the
ancient Hebrews, the poor must be agents of their own salva-
tion. Exodus also shows “a God who ‘takes sides’ ” against the
oppression of Pharaoh, then and now.94
On matters of dogma and ecclesiology (Church structure and
governance), Liberation Theologians are generally conservative
(but see below). For one thing, they do not need to deal with the
“God problem”—the skepticism, atheism, and agnosticism—of
Catholics and Protestants in the developed West, because such
attitudes are lacking in the Latin American masses.
Brazil is the country where Liberation Theology and Praxis
have had the greatest impact.95 In fact, the theory or theology
was a response to a movement that began in the late 1950s.
Inspired by French Catholic youth movements and the progres-
sive Catholicism of Emmanuel Mounier and his journal L’Esprit,
the Brazilian Catholic Student Youth (Juventude Universitária
Católica, or JUC) quickly took over the national student organi-
zation (União Nacional dos Estudantes, or UNE). Its members
pushed French ideas in a radical direction in 1960.96 Two years
later, UNE published an odd title for a secular student organiza-
tion: Cristianismo hoje (Christianity Today); it consisted of writ-
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ings by theologians, including the Jesuit Father Henrique Vaz,
and JUC leader Herbet José de Souza, who later became a lead-
ing sociologist. The themes were those that Liberation Theology
would address later — “the Gospel of the poor, denouncing the
social structure of the rich; the Gospel of the worker and peasant
against the oppression of the powerful.”97 Simultaneously,
under the direction of the progressive mayor of Recife, Miguel
Arraes, JUC volunteers were helping Paulo Freire organize the
Movement of Popular Culture and popular literacy campaigns
based on conscientização. The radical Christian movement like-
wise affected peasant leagues. Thus, as the brothers Boff have
remarked, the praxis of liberation preceded Liberation Theol-
ogy.98
The radical ambient, threats to traditional social structures
and foreign capital, the polarization, the strikes, and the United
States’ fear of another, much larger Cuba brought about a coup
d’état on March 31-April 1, 1964. President João Goulart was
forced into exile, and hundreds of politicians, workers, students,
and intellectuals lost their political rights for ten years. Literacy
programs were dismantled. The highest ecclesiastical body in
the country, the National Council of Brazilian Bishops (CNBB),
publicly endorsed the coup to interdict the Communist threat.
The military, instituting a corporate dictatorship with revolving
chiefs of state, would not relinquish power for another twenty-
one years. In the increasingly arbitrary dictatorship after 1968,
an urban guerrilla campaign arose, only to be crushed in the
early 1970s, partly through the widespread use of torture.
The first churchman to publicly denounce this torture was the
bishop of Recife, Dom Helder Câmara, on a trip to Paris in 1970.
Soon thereafter Paul VI condemned torture in the abstract, and
most significantly, a progressive bishop from Rio Grande do
Sul, Aloísio Lorscheider, was elected president of the CNBB.
With the hardening of the dictatorship and the suppression or
liquidation of the legal and illegal opposition to the regime, the
Church—and particularly the CNBB—became the core of resis-
tance. The elevation of the Franciscan Paulo Evaristo Arns to the
archbishopric of São Paulo, replacing a conservative, gave
Catholicism a progressive cast in Brazil’s largest city. Bishop
Arns secretly led a campaign to document the outrage of tor-
ture, case by case, using a chance access to the military’s own
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records. Arns and his team, working with the (Protestant)
World Council of Churches, thus assembled the most fully doc-
umented story of torture in the postwar era.99 The results of the
investigation were published in Brasil, Nunca Mais (Brazil, never
again), which revealed the names of the torturers as well as
detailed their heinous crimes.
This activity advanced civil rights, but not “human rights”
more broadly, as understood in Liberation Theology. Yet here
too the CNBB was active, denouncing the military’s capitalist
modernization project as unjust (for example, the government’s
collusion in expelling peasants from the land, as ranchers
moved into the newly “developed” Amazon Valley). The bish-
ops of the Northeast and Central-West Brazil went further,
declaring capitalism to be “the root of evil” in a document one
writer calls “the most radical statement ever issued by a group
of bishops anywhere.”100 The CNBB itself, working with Marxist
social scientists, issued a Pastoral of the Land, based largely on the
classic Marxist analysis in The Agrarian Question by Karl Kaut-
sky.101 There is some evidence that in the 1970s and ’80s certain
Church circles even espoused the belief that peasants could and
would successfully resist capitalism, a position reminiscent of
the views Russian narodniki had held a century earlier.
But the main way in which the CNBB helped advance Libera-
tion Theology was by encouraging the formation of Christian
Base Communities (CEBs) so that tens of thousands of these
local organizations existed by 1980, far more than those in any
other Latin American country. By one estimate, two and a half
million people (the majority women) participated in CEBs by
the mid-eighties.102 As noted, these groups study and reflect on
Scripture and discuss the ways in which it applies to their daily
lives. The Base Communities intersect and interact with other
progressive movements and groupings, such as the Landless
Rural Workers’ Movement (Movimento dos Trabalhadores
Rurais Sem Terra). Clergy, nuns, and laity helped advance the
grassroots organization of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT),
Latin America’s only major Marxist party outside Cuba.103 As
such, however, the Base Communities are reluctant to address
issues beyond the local level, and sympathetic scholars are
divided on whether this tendency is desirable or not.104
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Although most Liberation Theologians have avoided the
issue of ecclesiology, the Brazilian brothers Boff have not: they,
and especially Leonardo, challenge the medieval structure of
authority in Church.105 The Franciscan’s position grew out of his
view that the self-liberation of the poor is not compatible with
the paternalism of the Church. For his views, Father Leonardo
was summoned before Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger in 1984, head
of the Vatican’s Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith, and was silenced for a year. Among the cardinal’s con-
cerns was the fear that Liberation Theology was becoming a
class-based ideology disguised as theology. While denying that
it was, Boff countered that ideology was part of the human con-
dition. Under pressure, one assumes, Father Boff left the Fran-
ciscan order in 1992 and became a lay theologian.
While critics on the Left noted that, until very recently, Liber-
ation Theology has been relatively conservative on women’s
issues (abortion in particular), John Paul II viewed Liberation
Theology as a radical tendency dangerous to the Faith. He has
consistently appointed bishops in Latin America who oppose it;
at least seventeen of his bishops to date have been members of
the extremely conservative Opus Dei movement. In Brazil, a
conservative, D. Lucas Moreira Neves, became president of the
CNBB in 1995 with the support of the Vatican.
Is the Liberationist movement therefore moribund in Brazil
and Latin America? If on the defensive, it is certainly not dead.
This is the opinion of Jorge Castañeda in his scholarly assess-
ment, Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold
War.106 None of the Liberation Theologians has recanted. The
Boff brothers want to struggle for democracy within the Church,
while Gustavo Gutiérrez remains commited to broad social
action. In recent years, the definition of the poor has been
expanded to include other oppressed groups—specifically Indi-
ans, Blacks, and women (for their double oppression). Bishop
Oscar Romero, the martyr of El Salvador; Father Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, Haiti’s first democratically elected president; and
Bishop Samuel Ruíz in Chiapas — whose Christian Base Com-
munities were the recruiting grounds for Zapatista rebels in
1994 — remind us that the progressive Church and Liberation
Theology were still a presence in the 1980s and 1990s. In Brazil,
on the 500th anniversary of Columbus’s voyage, the CNBB — in
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contrast to the pope’s own remarks in Santo Domingo — asked
forgiveness for sins against Blacks and Indians in the Church’s
complicity with conquerors and oppressors. Furthermore, the
Brazilian bishops acknowledged that the results of some of these
sins persist.107
V. Conclusion
We have considered four ideas, constructs that were associated
with a generation of Brazilians coming to maturity in the years
1940 to 1955,108 and which responded to the issues associated
with the rapid economic growth and the heady nationalism of
the late 1950s, followed by economic crisis and military dictator-
ship in the early 1960s. The writers in question were not only
contemporaries, but knew each other and communicated among
themselves. Three of them—Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, and Paulo Freire — had the same publisher, Editora
Paz e Terra, and occasionally met in the home of Fernando Gas-
parian, owner of the firm. All ideas responded to perceived
crises, and three—Structuralism, Liberation Theology, and Ped-
agogy of the Oppressed — sought to give theoretical expression
to processes or movements already underway. Dependency
analysis tried to explain why the Structuralist project had appar-
ently failed.
The first two of the ideas considered above, Structuralism and
Dependency, are primarily economic (though the latter also has
political and cultural implications). The crisis of Structuralism in
the mid-1960s — arising from the limitations of the import-sub-
stitution strategy of industrialization — gave rise to Depen-
dency. But the latter school seemed to offer no concrete
solutions for overcoming dependency and underdevelopment.
In the world of the 1990s, Neoliberalism is the triumphant eco-
nomic doctrine, but the ideological assault on state intervention
in the economy by the World Bank and other institutions may
mask the crucial role played by governments in the develop-
ment process.
The experience of East Asian countries is instructive in this
regard, and merits a brief digression. Although orthodox econo-
mists point to the “high-performing” countries of East Asia —
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and
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Taiwan — as successful examples of the application of liberal
policies leading to successful industrial exports, a revisionist
monographic literature has established that governments
played important roles in development through market inter-
vention in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.109 Moreover, the same
seven “high-performing” countries that achieved three times the
growth rates of Latin America and South Asia between 1960 and
1985 — and five times those of sub-Saharan Africa — also per-
formed considerably better than the latter areas with regard to
income distribution among social groups, partly because of state
policy, including land reform in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.110
One of the themes development economists now stress is the
importance of human, as opposed to physical, capital, and the
extension of primary education in the East Asian high-perform-
ers was, for the World Bank, “by far the largest single contribu-
tor to. . . [their] predicted growth rates.”111
Reacting to Neoliberal successes in East Asia and elsewhere,
Brazilian and other Latin American Structuralists during the
1980s reinvented their doctrine as “Neo-Structuralism.” The
new version would avoid the mistakes of import-substitution
industrialization and incorporate lessons from Neoliberalism,
seeking, for example, export opportunities in a flexible policy to
develop both internal and external markets: Prebisch’s “inward-
directed development” would be replaced by “development
from within.” The state would remain interventionist, seeking to
collaborate with the private sector, but would concern itself as
well with social development, environmental problems, and
equity issues.112
For the Brazilian Neo-Structuralist Winston Fritsch, the recur-
rent external disequilibrium that concerned Raúl Prebisch in the
1940s and 1950s could be overcome in the 1990s not by less
trade, but more, given the ever-rising share of manufactures in
the world market, and the limits of a strategy of the compression
of imports. Latin American nations should follow a policy of
generalized liberalization of trade combined with protection of
nascent industries, especially manufactures, based on criteria of
efficiency and competitiveness in the international market.113
Here “Neo-Structuralism” reconciles the Structuralist tradition,
emphasizing industrialization, with the mounting evidence
linking economic growth with international trade.
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Dependency, on the other hand, has perhaps been the least
vital of the four ideas considered above. The single most impor-
tant figure in the Dependency movement, Fernando Henrique
Cardoso, renounced his earlier views to win key endorsements
in his successful bid for the presidency of Brazil in 1994.114 Car-
doso was never a revolutionary, but those Dependency analysts
who were, such as Marini and Frank, abandoned their doctrines
with the collapse of the Soviet system. Moderate versions, which
called for “selective delinking” of underdeveloped economies
from the world market, did not score notable success. Brazil’s
efforts at developing a cutting-edge position in the computer
industry, for example, have been less than impressive.
Yet Dependency has not been barren. Initially the school was
extremely pessimistic about closing the technology gap between
developed countries and Latin America, but the Argentinean
Jorge Katz and his associates have undertaken a variety of case
studies showing how innovation occurs in manufacturing
industries in Latin American milieux, making use of compara-
tive advantage. These researchers hold out the possibility that if
Latin Americans cannot operate on the technological frontier
because of huge capital costs, they may operate not too far from
that frontier by taking advantage of lower labor costs in specific
and well-defined niches, as the East Asians did.115
I believe the jury is still out on Pedagogy of the Oppressed
and Liberation Theology. The viability of such ideas may be
diminished by their adherents’ use of Marxist analysis, in the
wake of the collapse of “really existing” socialist regimes. How-
ever, I believe that the Liberation Theologians, and Freire, were
he alive, would contend that Marxism is still useful as a sociol-
ogy of capitalism (and dependent capitalism, in particular) in a
country in which economic inequities have been so great for so
long.116 In the mid-nineties, Furtado’s view was still tenable that
industrial capitalism in Brazil has grown by concentrating
income in the upper social strata, even if the experience of East
Asian countries demonstrates that vigorous growth can be com-
bined with a more equitable sharing of the fruits of economic
progress.
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